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The	Indian	Ocean	Rorschach	test
The	Rorschach	test	asks	viewers	to	describe	their	interpretations	of	a	series	of	inkblots.	Like	the	psychological	test,
how	observers	interpret	what	is	taking	place	in	the	Indian	Ocean	depends	on	their	strategic	orientation,
argues	Nilanthi	Samaranayake	(CNA,	Washington).
	
A	map	of	the	Indian	Ocean	evokes	a	wide	range	of	potential	interpretations.	A	vast	sea-lane	highway	connecting
the	Middle	East	to	East	Asia?	The	engine	of	the	global	economy,	ranging	from	hydrocarbon	to	container	shipping?
A	series	of	ports	operated	or	built	by	China	that	could	someday	become	military	bases?	The	core	of	the	“Indo-
Pacific”	region?	Its	periphery?	The	Indian	Ocean	provides	a	Rorschach	test	for	watchers	of	the	region.	The
Rorschach	test	asks	viewers	to	describe	their	interpretations	of	a	series	of	inkblots.	Like	this	psychological	test,	how
observers	interpret	what	is	taking	place	in	the	Indian	Ocean	depends	on	their	strategic	orientation	because	so	much
continues	to	unfold	dynamically	here	in	the	realms	of	security,	economics,	and	governance.	At	the	end	of	the
second	decade	of	the	21st	century,	it	is	important	to	take	stock	of	developments	in	the	Indian	Ocean	—	from
smaller,	developing	resident	countries	to	larger	countries	with	geostrategic	ambitions	—	to	consider	where	the
region	stands	in	this	dynamic	period	of	evolution.
First,	developments	in	Indian	Ocean	security	have	had	unexpected	impacts.	Specifically,	transboundary,	non-
traditional	security	challenges	such	as	natural	disasters	and	piracy	have	had	impacts	on	traditional	security	and
major-power	relations.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	2004	tsunami	that	ravaged	Indonesia,	Sri	Lanka,	and	Thailand,	the
US,	India,	Japan,	and	Australia	formed	the	Tsunami	Core	Group	to	provide	disaster	relief.	This	grouping	evolved
into	the	Quadrilateral	Security	Dialogue	or	Quad.	At	its	height,	the	four	countries	participated	in	a	naval	exercise
called	MALABAR	in	2007	that	China	saw	as	threatening.	The	Quad	disbanded	by	the	next	year.	More	than	a
decade	later,	this	grouping	of	countries	has	restarted	quadrilateral	consultations	on	issues	of	strategic	importance	in
the	region.
Counterpiracy	operations	are	another	example	of	non-traditional	security	missions	having	a	traditional	security
impact	and	fundamentally	transforming	the	regional	environment.	In	the	first	decade	of	the	2000s,	pirate	attacks
originating	from	Somalia	began	to	impede	the	free	flow	of	commerce	in	the	western	Indian	Ocean.	As	a	result,
many	nations	contributed	naval	forces	to	combat	this	menace.	This	included	multinational	efforts	such	as	the	US-
led	Combined	Maritime	Forces,	NATO’s	Operation	Ocean	Shield,	and	the	EU’s	Operation	Atlanta.	Independent
deployers	included	India	and	China.	An	under-appreciated	outcome	is	that	this	deployment	provided	China	with	a
rationale	for	recurring	presence	in	the	Indian	Ocean.	Its	first	counterpiracy	forces	arrived	in	2009,	and	the	country
has	continued	to	deploy	forces	to	the	region,	including	submarines,	despite	the	decline	in	piracy	incidents.
Moreover,	this	non-traditional	security	mission	has	been	put	forward	as	a	rationale	for	China’s	first	overseas	base	in
Djibouti.
Second,	the	first	two	decades	of	the	21st	century	have	seen	the	dramatic	expansion	of	regional	architecture	to	help
disparate	stakeholders	—	in	African,	Asian,	and	Middle	Eastern	countries	as	well	as	in	Australia	—	navigate
complex	challenges	within	the	region.	Established	in	the	1990s,	the	Indian	Ocean	Rim	Association	(IORA)	has	been
revitalised	over	the	last	decade	and	now	numbers	22	members	after	Maldives’	entry	in	2019.	The	organisation
focuses	on	promoting	economic	growth	and	sustainable	development	and	has	taken	on	a	greater	role	in	regional
maritime	security	and	safety.	In	2017,	IORA	convened	a	Leaders	Summit	for	the	first	time	with	presidents	and	prime
ministers,	thereby	heightening	the	importance	of	the	biennial	gathering.
Meanwhile,	the	Indian	Ocean	Naval	Symposium	(IONS)	was	launched	in	2008	under	the	leadership	of	the	Indian
Navy	and	rotates	its	chair	every	two	years	like	IORA.	Unlike	IORA,	IONS	has	a	clear	security	mandate,	which
culminates	every	two	years	in	a	meeting	of	naval	chiefs.	Illustrating	its	growing	scope,	IONS	conducted	its	first-ever
exercise	at	sea	in	2017	in	the	Bay	of	Bengal.
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Third,	the	last	two	decades	have	seen	greater	reliance	on	international	legal	institutions	and	frameworks	to	advance
Indian	Ocean	governance,	though	with	mixed	results.	In	2012	and	2014,	Bangladesh,	Myanmar,	and	India	were
able	to	resolve	two	sets	of	bilateral	maritime	disputes	in	the	Bay	of	Bengal	through	the	International	Tribunal	for	the
Law	of	the	Sea	and	the	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration.	Meanwhile,	India,	China,	South	Korea,	and	Germany	have
utilised	the	International	Seabed	Authority	in	a	manner	consistent	with	international	legal	norms	for	seeking	rights	to
search	mostly	for	polymetallic	sulphides	in	the	Indian	Ocean.	Each	party	peacefully	conducts	exploration	activities
for	these	seabed	minerals.	Mauritius,	however,	has	seen	less	success	in	relying	on	international	institutions	to	bring
about	change	in	its	case	against	the	United	Kingdom	over	the	Chagos	Islands.	At	present,	the	UK	refuses	to	cede
control	of	its	Indian	Ocean	territory	—	including	Diego	Garcia,	where	US	military	forces	are	based.
As	we	enter	a	new	decade,	many	non-traditional	security	issues	will	continue	to	pose	challenges	in	the	Indian
Ocean.	The	region	will	be	prone	to	natural	disasters	that	require	military	forces	to	respond,	including	from	outside
the	region.	The	security	of	sea-lanes	will	continue	to	be	of	utmost	importance	for	the	free	flow	of	goods	and	will
require	the	coordination	of	multinational	naval	forces	for	their	protection.	Most	recently,	the	US	is	leading	an	effort
to	help	safeguard	shipping	in	the	Strait	of	Hormuz,	while	some	European	nations	are	planning	their	own	operations
to	protect	this	critical	chokepoint.
At	the	same	time,	traditional	security	issues	will	persist	in	Indian	Ocean	politics.	Regional	stakeholders	question	the
long-term	strategic	intentions	of	China’s	Belt	and	Road	Initiative	and	worry	that	Djibouti	is	only	the	first	of	many
Chinese	military	bases	in	the	Indian	Ocean.	Resident	countries,	for	their	part,	will	continue	to	modernise	their
maritime	forces,	heightening	the	risk	of	accidents	as	growing	navies	learn	how	to	operate	new	platforms	such	as
submarines.
In	the	economic	domain,	smaller	Indian	Ocean	nations	already	concerned	about	the	militarisation	of	the	region	by
major	powers	will	continue	to	seek	funding	for	infrastructure	development	—	from	China	as	well	as	from	Japan,	the
US,	the	EU,	and	increasingly	India.	For	the	near	future,	smaller	nations	will	be	reminded	of	their	dependence	on	the
major	powers	for	economic	development	but	also	by	these	powers’	military	and	diplomatic	might.	These	nations	will
need	to	work	to	preserve	their	agency	as	smaller	states	while	they	seek	to	meet	national	development	goals.
The	outlook	for	the	Indian	Ocean	regional	order	in	the	third	decade	of	the	21st	century	will	continue	to	depend	on	a
variety	of	dynamic	factors.	Foremost	among	these	are	the	strategic	push	and	pull	of	major	powers	and	smaller
nations,	the	economic	and	energy	trends	of	this	critical	waterway,	and	shifts	in	governance.
	
This	article	as	first	published	at	Observer	Research	Foundation.	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not
the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.	Photo	credit:	Egle
Sidaraviciute,	Unsplash.
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